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Purpose: An attempt to determine the possibility of using the global epidemic's state to 
implement geopolitical objectives by the Russian Federation on the example of Poland in the 
wider context of international geopolitical conditions around the Visegrad Group. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The paper uses mainly source texts and the content of expert 
interviews conducted at the turn of 2019/2020. The collected empirical data were then 
processed using theoretical methods such as analysis, synthesis, and comparison to formulate 
conclusions using deductive and inductive inference methods.  
Findings: It has been confirmed that in their foreign policy, the decision-making centers of 
the Russian Federation are willing to take advantage of the situation of the global epidemic to 
achieve their own geopolitical goals concerning other countries.  
Practical Implications: This study may be used in scientific and expert work on the Russian 
Federation's foreign policy in the COVID-19 era. 
Originality/Value: Lack of comprehensive scientific studies dedicated to implementing the 
Russian Federation's geopolitical objectives during the COVID-19 2019/2020 epidemic. 
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Poland has a special place in the Kremlin's geopolitical game for influence in Central 
and Eastern Europe. This is due to Warsaw's important role in several parallel 
geostrategic games conducted by Washington, Brussels, Moscow, and even Beijing. 
From Washington's perspective, Poland is an extremely dedicated ally that identifies 
its own national interests with those of the United States, even identifying its own 
ability to oppose Russia's aggression with sufficiently strong ties to the United States. 
In the game of influence, Polish decision-makers have repeatedly indicated that by 
choosing between the European Union and the American interests, they will 
ultimately choose the latter. On the other hand, Poland is an important element in 
stabilizing the geopolitical and geostrategic situation on the eastern borders of the 
Union and a country that initiates and conducts activities aimed at the possible 
enlargement of the Union to include Eastern European countries. Equally important 
for Brussels are also the strong political and economic ties between the countries of 
Central Europe, among which Poland has a strong position, regardless of the changing 
directions of its foreign policy in this part of Europe. The additional value of Poland's 
presence in the EU consists of maintaining good and constantly strengthened relations 
with the so-called Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), which is also correlated 
with American policy in Eastern Europe. 
 
In the article, the authors attempted to answer a problem question: Can the Russian 
Federation use the implications of the global epidemiological situation related to 
COVID-19 in its geopolitical plans for Poland? The reason for undertaking this issue 
was the ongoing observation of changes in the international arena as a result of the 
COVID-19 outbreak and an attempt to determine the implications for the possibility 
of achieving Russian geopolitical goals while at the same time increasing the 
dynamics of foreign activity of the Russian Federation since the end of the first decade 
of the 21st century.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Thus, gaining the opportunity to influence Warsaw's political decision-making 
process allows influencing Brussels and Washington's foreign policy, leading to 
mutual animosities or the non-conflicting pursuit of specific interests. In the 
pessimistic variant, taking control of Warsaw would significantly weaken American 
influence in this part of Europe and guarantee the possibility of a strong influence on 
Brussels' internal decision-making process (Baumann 2020; Götz 2016; Götz 2017).  
 
Given the complex network of mutual relations between Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, and the Baltic States, the benefits of such an action would be 
particularly valuable for Moscow, striving to rebuild the sphere of influence lost after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the current situation, many Russian initiatives 
may be limited or even blocked, and decision-makers in the Kremlin are never sure 





whether it is Warsaw's own initiative or coordinated action in agreement with 
Washington or, in extreme cases, with Brussels. An example of such events was the 
Polish involvement during the war in Georgia (Seguin et al., 2016; Bayulgen and 
Arbatlim, 2013), which ultimately led to a reduction in the initially intended actions 
due to the lack of certainty as to the actual initiators potentially responsible for the 
actions taken by the Polish capital at that time on the territory considered by the 
Kremlin as its own exclusive sphere of influence.  
 
It may sound high-flying, but Poland can be compared to the chessboard center during 
a game of chess if this game was about taking control of the geopolitical and 
geostrategic situation in Central and Eastern Europe. This particular situation is also 
known to decision-makers in Beijing who, when planning the New Silk Road project 
aimed at gradually expanding and strengthening the Chinese sphere of influence in 
Europe, identified Poland as a gateway to the free development of the project 
concerning both Central Europe and the Balkans. Thus, if you gain the opportunity to 
influence the Polish decision-making process, you can influence the American sphere 
of influence, the EU decision-making process, and the New Silk Road project in 
Europe, which is strategically important for Beijing. In conclusion, the Russians will 
not give up on seeking to regain their former influence or even trying to take control 
of decisions made in Warsaw, as these decisions are seen as strategically important 
for the Russian national interest, but also from a geostrategic point of view the 
possibility of establishing an appropriate buffer zone providing the Russian 
Federation with safe space in the event of hostile military and paramilitary actions.  
 
Regardless of the European perspective and the perception of such threats as 
unrealistic, this way of thinking and perceiving the surrounding international reality 
still prevails in Moscow. For this reason, any form of strengthening the American 
presence in Poland (especially in the military dimension) is perceived in Moscow as 
an increase in the real threat. Therefore, it is no wonder that decision-makers in the 
Kremlin are using all possible forces and means to prevent or limit any action aimed 
at successively strengthening the American potential in this part of Europe, especially 
in Poland. On the other hand, the weakening of this potential or the complete 
resignation of Washington from Poland as an ally would immediately be seen as an 
incredible opportunity that should be used immediately to take control of such an 
attractive "no-man's-land" from Moscow's point of view. Russians perceive 
international reality through the prism of the powers, their interests, and zones of 
influence.  
 
Individual weaker states outside any alliance with major powers shall be treated as 
assets, which, depending on their value, shall be developed as soon as possible to 
prevent other powers from taking advantage of this opportunity. Such a perception of 
Poland by Moscow is undoubtedly damaging to the Polish sense of decency and 
respect for its own, so dearly paid independence. Unfortunately, this Russian approach 
is also true. As a result, Russian decision-makers will continue to view Poland only 
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as a valuable international asset to be sought after and await a suitable opportunity to 
rebuild a sufficiently strong position by including Warsaw in their own highly 
hierarchical sphere of influence. 
 
3. Research Results and Discussion 
 
The epidemiological threat resulting from the uncontrolled spread of the deadly 
COVID-19 virus has profoundly remodeled the global socio-economic system, 
affecting its previously stable functioning (Szymanski, Smuniewski, and Platek, 
2020). In this sudden new reality, many new challenges have crystallized, from which 
threats and opportunities for the powers seeking new opportunities to pursue their 
interests may flow. It was no different this time, too, in the case of the Russian view 
of Poland, which has become the object of intense informational influences aimed 
mainly at dividing Polish society into smaller groups with conflicting viewpoints.  
 
Also, rapidly forming ad-hoc view groups joined in the rivalry between the two main 
political forces: the option currently in power and the opposition's comprehensive 
perception. In the second half of 2020, presidential elections were held, which also 
served as a basis for expanding the epidemic's various narrative lines. This has 
allowed Russian media centers, on the one hand, to keep up to date with the 
possibilities of shaping public opinion in this particular period and, on the other hand, 
to test in practice the possibilities of influencing electoral decisions. One month before 
the electoral campaign's intensification, all election polls (conducted both by the 
ruling camp, opposition circles, and neutral companies providing professional polling 
services) gave the candidate of the ruling option a decisive advantage over rivals 
representing the opposition forces. At the time of the election, this candidate won with 
an almost marginal advantage, and, statistically speaking, the results of both 
candidates were equal. This means that in the course of the election, the ruling option 
candidate lost his advantage only a month earlier, which demonstrated how strong the 
impact of a particular epidemiological state of emergency generating an elevated 
emotional state in most voters could be on the outcome of the election. 
 
On the other hand, the ruling camp received a clear warning signal, indicating that it 
is beginning to lose its advantage over the opposition, and public support is falling. It 
cannot be clearly stated that the outcome of the elections resulted from the activities 
of the Russian centers responsible for information impact (Monica, Nicolae, and 
Breban, 2010). However, the expert interviews conducted show that these centers 
were strongly involved in antagonizing Polish society by evoking stormy discussions 
and creating elevated emotional states mainly through activity carried out in virtual 
space.  
 
It should be added that the model of informational influence by evoking and 
increasing extreme (most often negative) emotional states is a tool of psychological 
influence that has been used continuously and improved for decades and has been 





used first by Soviet and later Russian information centers (Baumann, 2020; Hejlová 
and Klimeš, 2019; Myers, 2015). There were many scientific centers in the Soviet 
Union improving so-called social control engineering to evoke and direct social 
moods and, if necessary, the behavior of crowds (Monica, Nicolae, and Breban, 2010). 
Nowadays, virtual space is most often used for this purpose, including social media, 
which can be proved by using the services of the so-called "troll farms" 
(Shaikhutdinova, 2020).  
 
Regardless of the level of effectiveness achieved by Russian information activities on 
Polish society, one can undoubtedly state that the goal was to divide into antagonistic 
social groups with opposite views internally. Such activities could also fit into the 
early stages of the so-called "ideological diversion" described by Y. Bezmienowa 
(2017). Mutual antagonization of the society, in the end, leads to the functioning of 
many opposing groups, which allows to create and strengthen the chosen group in 
order to take over the power over the given society finally. From that point on, this 
group aims further to strengthen the Kremlin's influence in a given country or 
strengthen its own power to destabilize the economy to a level that allows another 
group, also created and promoted, to take full (absolute) power. Therefore, knowing 
the "modus operandi" of Russian information activities and being aware that they 
intensified during the epidemiological state resulting from the spread of COVID-19, 




Considering the Kremlin's geopolitical perspective on Poland's location at the meeting 
point of the zones of influence of the four powers, it can be assumed that the objective 
of the information activities undertaken during the COVID-19 epidemic is to weaken 
Polish-American and ultimately Polish-Union relations. As a result, from Moscow's 
perspective, this process should end with Poland's exit from NATO and the EU, which 
would open the way for decisive and intensive action to regain control over Warsaw's 
decision-making process.  
 
On the one hand, it would significantly weaken the United States' position in Central 
and Eastern Europe, which is strategically vital for Moscow, but it would also open 
up opportunities for much more offensive action towards Central, Southern, and 
Northern Europe. It would significantly cut off the Baltic States from the US-EU 
sphere of influence, increasing their influence on their decision-making centers. 
Almost immediately, it would also solve the growing problem of Belarus seeking total 
decision-making sovereignty. All these activities would be possible at a relatively low 
cost, while at the same time enabling the Kremlin to achieve its long-term geopolitical 
and geostrategic goals in this part of the world so crucial for Russian decision-makers.  
 
In conclusion, the accepted problem question was answered, and potential geopolitical 
and geostrategic consequences resulting from the implementation of Russian long-
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term plans for Poland perceived as an essential element of Central and Eastern 
Europe's security architecture were identified. 
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